Abstract: Carbon budgets are a useful way to frame the climate mitigation challenge and much easier to agree upon than the allocation of emissions. We propose a mechanism with countries agreeing on the global carbon budget, while the decision to emit is decentralized at the country level. The revenue is collected in a global fund and allocated according to endogenously defined weights proportional to the marginal cost of climate change. The proposal features a unanimous 10 agreement of the national citizenries of the world and global Pareto efficiency. We run a simulation in the spirit of the Paris Agreement, with zero emissions after 2055. At the Global Unanimity Equilibrium, permits are priced at 90$/tC, yielding 1.3 trillion dollars annually. Africa, India and the less developed countries in Asia are the only net recipients, while the US and China are the largest net contributors.
Introduction
The global emissions problem is one where non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium among countries in the choice of their national emissions will suffer from the tragedy of the commons. 1 That name is simply a dramatic way of saying that in the emissions 'game,' the Nash equilibrium is (massively) Pareto inefficient. Countries must cooperate to avoid this bad equilibrium. The COP 5 meetings are venues that should be understood as attempts to build trust and solidarity among nations, so a cooperative solution that is Pareto efficient can be achieved. 2 However, a climate agreement to reduce emissions has been proved difficult to achieve.
The global carbon budget, we argue, is a useful way of framing the climate mitigation challenge and perhaps a much easier issue to agree upon than the allocation of emission permits. We 10 propose a method by which the decision on the level of carbon emissions can be decentralized to the regional or country level, where firms treat their emissions as a production input for which a price is charged. The revenues from these charges accumulate in a global fund, and are returned to global citizens according to national shares that are announced ex ante. We model the global economy as one with a single good, produced in all countries according to nationally specific 15 production functions, which use labor and capital as inputs, and emit carbon according to nationally specific intensities with respect to output. We propose a global equilibrium in capital, output, and emissions. The markets for capital and output are standard. The market for carbon emissions is not. As mentioned, the demands for carbon emissions of countries are set by the profit-maximizing firms in each country, which must pay for standard inputs and proposed 20 emissions. The supply of global emissions is unanimously agreed upon by country/regional citizenries. In choosing its desired global level of carbon emissions, each country maximizes the utility of its representative citizen, who benefits from consumption of the (unique consumption) good, and suffers damages from the global emissions level. In equilibrium, all markets clear: in particular, all countries agree upon the desired global carbon budget, which equals (in 25 equilibrium) the sum total of the demands for carbon emissions of the world's firms.
The virtues of the proposal are the following: (1) the global emissions level is not set by negotiations but by unanimous agreement of the national citizenries of the world; (2) the demand to emit carbon is decentralized to the firm level; (3) the equilibrium is globally Pareto efficient -there is no feasible allocation of capital, the good, and emissions that could make all countries better off. The system can be viewed as one in which each country's firms demand permits to emit carbon, for which they pay a common price, and the vector of country shares for the distribution of the carbon fund assures country unanimity of agreement on what the number of carbon permits globally should be.
In our approach, decisions to emit are made at the firm level. Because firms decide upon 5 their emissions as part of a profit-maximizing plan, no firm has an incentive to emit more than it demands. Substantial negotiations would be required to achieve agreement on the production and damage functions that characterize nations/regions. And the shares according to which the global carbon revenues are returned to nations must appear to be fair, for if they are not accepted, then unanimity on the global emissions level will dissolve. But once the mechanism is implemented, 10 it will only be necessary to monitor that firms do pay for their profit-maximizing emissions to the global fund.
A global unanimity equilibrium
In this section, we model the above proposal and study its properties. There are n countries, each 15 endowed with labor, capital, and a technology for producing a single good. Country j is represented by an agent with a quasi-linear utility function
where x represents the GDP per capita of the country, h j is a convex damage function, and E is the global level of carbon emissions. Each country has a concave aggregate production function
where y is output of the single good and K is capital. It is assumed that labor is immobile across countries, but capital is mobile. Therefore, the production function G j assumes full employment of the country's labor supply, which is implicit in equation (2) . Besides its labor supply, country j is endowed with capital in the amount K j .
25
Emissions are assumed to be proportional to production 3, 4 E j = η j y j . 
Definition 2. A feasible allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible allocation that
gives at least one country higher utility and no country lower utility.
5
We now describe how the economy works. There are three markets: for the produced good, whose price will be denoted p ; for capital, whose interest rate is r ; and for carbon emissions, whose price is c . The firm in each country will demand capital to maximize profits:
where it must pay the carbon cost of the emissions it creates. All profits, which here include 10 wages because labor is implicit in the production function, are returned to the population of the country. The carbon payments are deposited in an international fund, and will be distributed to countries as demogrants, where country j will receive back a fraction a j of total revenues.
Thus, along with the price vector (p,c,r) , global citizens observe a vector of shares (a 1 ,...,a n )∈Δ n−1 , where Δ n−1 is the unit simplex in ℜ n−1 .
15
The income of country j will be:
where E is global emissions, and so c E is the value of the carbon fund. Each country supplies its entire capital endowment to the market.
It is clear there is a supply and demand for capital, and there is also a supply and demand 20 for the good, because each country will demand the good in amount I j p .
The demand for emissions is determined by the firms' profit-maximizing choices, but we have yet to determine the supply of emissions, which we do as follows. Note that the utility of country j is given by:
For the citizenry of country j , the optimal level of global emissions, E , is therefore given by the first-order condition:
We close the model by requiring that the citizenries of the n countries unanimously agree on the value of E . Thus, the global citizenry 'supplies' the emission permits in toto to firms.
5
We summarize the equilibrium of the economy as follows.
Definition 3
A global unanimity equilibrium is a price vector (p,c,r) , a share vector (a 1 ,...,a n )∈Δ n−1 , an allocation (x 1 ,...,x n ,K 1 ,...,K n ,E 1 ,...,E n ) , and a global supply of emission permits E such that: 
We have: Economists will recognize that a global unanimity equilibrium is a species of Lindahl equilibrium. How would the equilibrium be achieved? An international team would collect the data (damage functions, production functions, capital endowments, carbon intensities of production) and compute the equilibrium, as we do in the next section. In particular, the share vector a = (a 1 ,...,a n ) would be computed, and as we see from equation (9) , the country shares of the emissions fund are proportional to marginal damages at the solution. As we wrote, the virtues of the solution are global Pareto efficiency, unanimity of agreement on the global carbon budget, and decentralization of the demands for carbon permits.
Results
To illustrate the implications of a global unanimity equilibrium, we simulate a 12-region world Results are summarized in Table 1 and Fig. 1 . The following points are worth emphasizing:
1. Africa, China and India receive the largest shares of total revenue, being the regions with the highest marginal costs of increases in temperature according to RICE-2010. These three regions together receive over half of total revenue.
2. However, when we account for the contribution to the global fund, China becomes the second largest net contributor, with a net payment of 78 billion dollars, only after the 99 5 billion dollars of net contribution by the USA ( Fig. 1 and last column in Table 1 ). The net contributions of these two regions alone amount for almost 60% of the total amount by net contributors. GDP is the average value for the region in 2016-2055, the period under consideration. The climate response of zero emissions is an important source of uncertainty in understanding the long-term climate response to a given quantity of cumulative emissions. We have followed the view that temperature tends to remain stable after zero emissions. We base our advocacy of the proposal offered on its following attractive features:
• It decentralizes the achievement of a globally Pareto efficient allocation of capital, the good, and emissions; in particular, firms propose profit-maximizing levels of emissions, 5 where the cost of emissions to them is determined by an equilibrium price that equates 'supply' and 'demand' for emissions.
• While the demand for emission (permits) is left to firms, the global supply of permits is determined by unanimous agreement among nations, concerning what global emissions level maximizes the country's utility, given the prices of the good, capital and emissions, 10 and the vector of shares (a 1 ,...,a n ) .
• No central authority sets the global supply of permits, nor is there any ex ante allocation of permits to individual firms or nations.
• In equilibrium, the share of the global revenues from emissions fees that a country/region receives is proportional to the marginal damages from global emissions that it sustains. 15 Thus, countries with more severe marginal damages are compensated more.
• Our simulations indicate that, over a 40 year period, about $370 billion per annum would be transferred from the global North to the global South. The three regions that are net recipients of these transfers are Africa, India and Other Asian. This is almost four times to annual transfers agreed upon in Paris. Global income distribution would as well 20 improve, in the sense of lowering inter-regional inequality, although that was not an explicit goal of the proposal.
-13 -We do not wish to attempt a stronger ethical defense of the shares (a 1 ,...,a n ) according to which the emissions fund will be distributed. The main justification of the specific share vector is that it engenders Pareto efficiency and global unanimity of national/regional citizenries with regard to the global emissions budget. Because arriving at a cooperative solution to this massive challenge to our species at this time is so important, the achievement of those objectives, we 5 propose, is sufficient justification.
Methods
Here we explain in detail the components of the model for our application and their calibration based on RICE-2010: utility function, production function, carbon intensity and endowments 10 (stock of capital and population).
Utility is measured as the present value of average annual consumption v(x j ), net of climate damages h j (E) related to annual emissions E ,
Both consumption and damages are measured in trillions of international US dollars. For a 15 discount factor ρ and a period of N years, the present value of consumption is simply
Climate change damages are generated by the increase in temperature, which, ultimately, depends on cumulative emissions. We proceed in three steps: First, we calibrate annual climate change damages for region j as a function of the increase in temperature ΔT . 
The utility function of region j for the next N years results from (9), (10), and (14):
The utility level represents the present discounted value of consumption net of medium-and long-term costs from climate change.
Production is a function of labor and capital, and, as in RICE-2010, of the Cobb-Douglas type: (Table S3 , Fig. S2 ).
Letting κ j = A j (L j ) 1−γ , the production function can be expressed as
The values of κ j are presented in column 2 of Table S4 in the supplementary notes. (Table S4 ).
-16 -Summarizing, each region is characterized by a utility function (15) with region specific damages from climate change, a production function (17) with region specific TFP and population, an average annual stock of capital, and a carbon intensity parameter. All calibrated values are provided in Table S4 in Before proving the proposition, we provide the necessary conditions for Pareto efficiency.
10

Lemma 1
The necessary first-order conditions for an allocation to be Pareto efficient are:
where
Proof: The conditions for Pareto efficiency are given by solving the following program:
The program is not convex, because of the last constraint (the {G i } are concave functions).
Therefore the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary but not sufficient for the solution of (PE).
Then the K-T conditions are:
From this last equation we have the conditions:
These are the stated conditions in proposition. ■
Proof of Proposition 1
The f.o.c.s for profit-maximization are : 15 The f.o.c.s for the unanimous agreement on the level of global emissions E are:
from which it follows that (h l )'(E) = c p ∑ . Substituting this into equation (S1) gives: (Table S1) adjusted-R 2 above 99% (Table S2 ). Figure S1 shows the fit of the calibration. , it follows that climate damages in year t
Therefore,
Supplementary Note 4: Computing the unanimity equilibrium
We restrict the price vector (p,c,r) to the unit simplex Δ 2 . Thus, we write r = 1− p − c . Then the 25 first-order conditions for profit maximization of the firms can be written:
Now consider the three equations:
Equation (S9) says the capital market clears; equation (S10) follows from the fact that E is the unanimous choice by citizenries of the global emissions level; and equation (S11) says that the emissions market clears. Walras's Law assures us that the goods market clears. Using equation (S8) we eliminate the variables {K j } from equations (S9)-(S11), which now become three simultaneous equations in (p,c,E) . Solving these equations gives the equilibrium. 10 The Mathematica © program solves equations (S8)-(S11) for (p,c) , E and K as follows.
1. First, define K j (p,c) from the FOC of profit maximization
2. Use (S12) in the capital market clearing condition: 15 3. The clearing condition for the market for emissions and (S12) imply
4. Finally, from the FOC of the unanimity equilibrium − K j * : the stock of capital for each region, using (S12);
− the price of capital: r
− the share of total revenue for region j : 
Supplementary Note 5: Robustness check
The magnitude of climate damages in DICE and RICE models are most likely underestimated.
For a robustness check we repeat the analysis for a range of much larger damages. In particular, we study allocations for damages 2, 5 and 10-fold those used in RICE2010 (that is, we consider 2 × α 1j ,5 × α 1j , and 10 × α 1j in (S4)). We find that the allocation of net recipients shows similar Table S5 . Annual Income (GDP) and annual net payment from emission permits. Income is measured as gross firm revenues plus net income from capital minus the net payment for emission permits:
Population is the average population in 2016-2055.
